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Abstract
The political winds are changing, and a more liberal United States government may very well
be receptive to ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The na-
ture and scope of international law are also changing. Individuals are sharing responsibility with
states for grave breaches of international law, and globalization has resulted in a marked increase
in international tribunals deciding disputes affecting individual interests. Despite these trends,
Americans have been wary of the International Criminal Court. Federal courts principles bor-
rowed from the legal process school can and should be implemented to govern relations between
ICC and domestic courts, for there is much to be gained from an international criminal court with
the power to deter and punish those who commit the most severe crimes. In addition, a positive in-
teraction between the ICC and the U.S. will contribute to what philosopher Emmanuel Kant named
“the federalism of free nations,” which is a “decentralized system of cooperative relations among
nations that, where possible, advances goals of democracy and respect for individual rights.”
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INTRODUCTION
The hottest new investment opportunity might surprise
you-art and antiquities restitution claims. Syndicates of inves-
tors are forming to fund an art or antiquities case from start to
finish. From researching displaced works, to tracking down the
potential owner, then covering the cost of filing fees, discovery
expenses and possibly even an appeal, financing a restitution
case can be expensive. However, the payout can be phenome-
nal-possibly in the nine figures. Art and antiquities restitution
cases may be the tobacco litigation of this decade, thanks to the
jurisdiction-granting provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act ("FSIA").
This Article will examine the emergence of art and antiqui-
ties restitution cases being brought in U.S. federal courts under
the FSIA. The purpose of the Article is twofold. First, it aims to
serve as a compendium of the major art and antiquities restitu-
tion cases brought under the FSIA up to this point. In addition,
it examines several questions concerning the appropriateness of
the FSIA being used in the way it has been in the context of the
art cases. Have the jurisdiction granting provisions springing
from the exceptions to the FSIA eclipsed the primary purpose of
foreign sovereign immunity, which is to shield foreign States
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Science at Baylor University. She received herJ.D. from the University of Tulsa College
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from litigation in U.S. courts? If so, is this permissible under
U.S. law?
To achieve these purposes and attempt to answer these
questions, Section I will introduce the topic with a look back to
the expropriation of millions of pieces of art and antiquities dur-
ing World War II. The Section will then explain why, after six
decades, art restitution cases are increasing in their frequency.
Section II traces the evolution of the doctrine of foreign sover-
eign immunity in U.S. law from its historical foundations,
through the enactment of the FSIA, to its expansive modern in-
terpretation. Section III documents the recent art and antiqui-
ties cases that have been decided by U.S. courts under the FSIA.
Section IV examines whether the FSIA's use as a "sword" to bring
the arts and antiquities cases is appropriate under U.S. law, and
Section V examines three legal doctrines that may soften the
blow of the FSIA as a tool for gaining jurisdiction over foreign
States.
I. WHY THERE IS AN INCREASE IN ART AND ANTIQUITIES
CASES BEING LITIGATED IN UNITED
STATES COURTS
Millions of pieces of art and antiquities changed hands
under suspect circumstances before, during, and after World
War 11.1 Incredibly, some scholars theorize that during this pe-
riod about twenty percent of all art in the Western world was
stolen or extorted.2 This plunder was systematic, as Hitler and
the Nazi party raided the treasures of the European Jews.3 Hitler
1. See Stephen E. Weil, The American Legal Response to the Problem of Holocaust Art, 4
ART, ANTIQUITY & LAw 285, 285 (1999). Holocaust related art is art and/or antiquities
obtained through illegal or immoral means from 1933 to 1945 and is comprised of not
only hundreds of thousands of works of flat art but sculptures, sacred manuscripts,
books, musical scores, antiquities, treasures from churches and synagogues, classical
antiquities, furniture, and numismatic and archaeological collections. See Norman
Palmer, Memory and Morality: Museum Policy and Holocaust Cultural Assets, 6 ART, ANTIQ:
uITY & LAw 259, 260 (2001).
2. See Benjamin E. Pollock, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation to prompt an
International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 Hous. L. REv. 193, 195 n.9 (2006)
(citing Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a Mediation/Arbitration Commission to Resolve Dis-
putes Relating to Artworks Stolen or Looted During World War II, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. & POL'Y 27, 36 (1999)).
3. See Anne-Marie Rhodes, On Art Theft, Tax, and Time: Triangulating Ownership
Disputes Through the Tax Code, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 495, 500 (2006). See generally HEC-
TOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAzI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD'S
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and his party leaders amassed great collections of art for them-
selves, with thousands upon thousands more pieces of art stored
in warehouses, underground mines and other places.4 Looting
of art during this period did not end with the Nazis. After World
War 11, the Allies had problems returning looted property to its
rightful owners. In fact, Allied victors did their own share of
pillaging. The official Soviet policy with regard to the return of
items was to "keep what they discovered."6 The case Chabad v.
Russian Federation, discussed below, is an example.7 Americans
looted artwork as well. One highly publicized example is that of
Joe Meador, an army lieutenant who looted a German Cathedral
after World War 11.8
Most of the art and antiquities displaced during World War
II have never been restored to their owners or their heirs.9 At
least one hundred thousand pieces are still missing.'0 Further
complicating the situation, many of the pieces have changed
hands through the years and have been acquired in good faith
by innocent third parties.'" In addition, distinguishing between
a legitimate sale and one that violated international law is very
difficult when decades have passed and the sale occurred during
a time of war. 12
A crucial question in this study is why now, after six decades,
is there a sharp increase in art litigation? There are several im-
portant reasons. To start with, the cases themselves are generat-
ing public interest and precedent, which generate more cases.
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, which went all the way to the U.S.
GREATEST WORKS OF ART (2d ed. 1997); LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE
FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994).
4. See Howard N. Spiegler, Recovering Nazi-Looted Art: Report from the Front Lines, 16
CONN. J. INT'L L. 297, 299 (2001).
5. See Pollock, supra note 2, at 197-98.
6. Id. at 198.
7. See Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2006).
8. See The First Lieutenant's Booty (Joe Meador's Medieval Art Collection), ECONOMIST,
July 7, 1990, at 86. Among the items stolen was a work by Samuel Gosphels. See Ruth
Redmond-Cooper, Quedlinburg Indictment Comes Too Late, 3 ART, ANTIQUITY & LAW 307,
307 (1998). Another example that gained a good deal of publicity was that of two
DOrer portraits taken from an East German museum and sold to a collector by a U.S.
soldier. See Palmer, supra note 1, at 268.
9. See Weil, supra note 1, at 285.
10. See Kelly Crow, The Bounty Hunters, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2007, at W1.
11. See id.
12. See Weil, supra note 1, at 289.
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Supreme Court, is a good example. 13 Besides the cases them-
selves, there has been a marked increase in scholarly and jour-
nalistic interest in the subject.14 In fact, ajournalist that exposed
facts pertaining to Austria's expropriation of several Gustav
Klimt paintings set in motion the chain of events leading up to
the Altmann case discussed in this Article. 5 In addition, some
books about Nazi art looting have been so thorough that they
have greatly assisted plaintiffs in proving theft.' 6 Information is
becoming available for the first time as war documents are de-
classified. 7
Technological advance is another huge boon to those
searching for lost paintings. Online art databases and websites
listing museum archives make feasible what was once impossi-
ble. 8 A corollary to this point is that there is a growing willing-
ness on the part of museums to open their collections and
archives to persons searching for art. 9 An example of this is the
recent occurrence of Russia returning a collection of rare books
to Hungary that had been taken as war trophies during World
13. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
14. See Sue Choi, The Legal Landscape of the International Art Market After Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 26 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 167, 181 (2005). For example, the leading
authors on the subject that played a large part in increasing interest in Nazi looted art
cases are FELIcANo, supra note 3, and N1cHoLAS, supra note 3; see also Weil, supra note 1,
at 286 (explaining that there has been a recent "avalanche of books, newspaper and
magazine articles.").
15. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 684.
In 1998 a journalist examining the Gallery's files discovered documents re-
vealing that at all relevant times Gallery officials knew that neither Adele nor
Ferdinand had, in fact, donated the six Klimts to the Gallery. The journalist
published a series of articles reporting his findings, and specifically noting that
Klimt's first portrait of Adele, 'which all the [Gallery] publications repre-
sented as having been donated to the museum in 1936,' had actually been
received in 1941, accompanied by a letter from Dr. Fthrer signed 'Heil
Hider.'
Id.
16. See David Wissbroecker, Six Klimts, a Picasso & a Schiele: Recent Litigation At-
tempts to Recover Nazi Stolen Art, 14 DEPAuL-LCAJ. ART. & ENr. L. & PoL'v 39, 44 (2004)
(explaining how the first significant claim on stolen art was made against the backdrop
of the first extensive works on Nazi looting).
17. See Choi, supra note 14, at 181. The end of the Cold War has facilitated this
declassification. See Pollock, supra note 2, at 198.
18. See generally Crow, supra note 10. In addition, The Art Loss Register is an im-
portant database that has connected people with their art. See Art Loss Register, http://
www.artloss.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
19. See Wissbroecker, supra note 16, at 70.
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War 11.20 The Moscow Foreign Literature Library greatly assisted
Hungary in regaining possession of the books by publishing a
catalog listing the Hungarian collection. 21 The director of the
library's cooperation also proved instrumental in the return of
the books. 2
A crucially important piece of this puzzle is the recent in-
crease in art prices. It is now not uncommon for a painting to
sell at auction for more than US$100 million. 2' These lofty
prices make it very hard for claims to be resolved quickly.24
Higher art prices also equate to higher contingency fees for law-
yers representing plaintiffs in art cases. 25 This has resulted in
syndicates of investors funding the search for plaintiffs and the
fees of litigation, who in turn receive a piece of the potential
enormous recovery. According to one Wall Street Journal re-
porter, "restitution has become big business. 26
Another factor in the equation of increasing art litigation
cases is changing attitudes about restorative justice.27 There is
an emerging idea that something can and should be done to
rectify, at least in part, the atrocities of the Holocaust.2 The
taking of art as a part of war has a "psychological and emotional
dimension" that only its return can satisfy. 29 Furthermore, pro-
viding a judicial forum for the return of art is a public repudia-
20. See Patricia Kennedy Grimsted & Konstantin Akinsha, The Sdrospatak Case: Rare
Books Return to Hungary From Nizhnii Novgorod: A New Precedent for Russian Cultural Resti-
tution?, 11 ART, ANTIQUITY & LAw 215, 215 (2006). One hundred forty-six books were
returned. They were rare books that had been a part of the Sdrospatak library, part of a
college founded in 1531. Id. at 216. It is important to note that while attitudes of some
museums have changed, this is not yet the norm. "[I]t is fair to say that claimants
should be prepared for litigation - perhaps long drawn-out litigation - to reclaim their
Nazi-looted property." Spiegler, supra note 4, at 298.
21. See Grimsted & Akinsha, supra note 20, at 218. The library has played an im-
portant role in identifying and cataloging significant foreign books in Russia. See id. at
218-20.
22. See id. at 227-28.
23. See Billionaire Buyers Stoke Surging Art Market, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 18, 2006, at
B14.
24. See Rhodes, supra note 3, at 498.
25. A typical contingency fee is one-third of the recovery. See Crow, supra note 10.
26. Id.
27. See Spiegler, supra note 4, at 312 (citing Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in
America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 165
(2000)).
28. See Weil, supra note 1, at 286.
29. Id. at 300.
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tion of evil.3 °
II. HISTORY AND EXPLANATION OF THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. Historical Background
The United States adhered to an absolute theory of sover-
eign immunity prior to 1952, whereby foreign sovereigns were
totally immune from suit in U.S. courts." Absolute immunity
prevented suits or attachment of a foreign sovereign's property
without that sovereign's consent.3 2 There was a two-part ratio-
nale for this theory.33 To begin with, there was a threshold idea
that States should respect each other's independence. 34 A sec-
ond idea was based on separation of powers, namely that it is not
for courts to settle issues of foreign relations. 5 An early United
States Supreme Court case, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,36
is generally understood to be the source of American sovereign
immunity jurisprudence. 7 The case involved two U.S. citizens
that asserted ownership over a French warship that docked in a
U.S. port during the war of 1812.38 The ship had previously
been captured by the French Navy en route to Spain and modi-
fied for war.3 9 The Schooner Exchange case made its way through
the federal court system all the way to the United States Supreme
Court, which held that a "public armed vessel of a foreign state,
at peace with the United States, is exempt from the jurisdiction
of its local tribunals while enjoying in a friendly manner the hos-
pitality of its waters."4 In so holding, the Court explained that a
warship is part of the military force of its nation and interference
with such would affect the power and dignity of the nation.41 In
30. See id. at 299.
31. See Choi, supra note 14, at 174.
32. See E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of For-
eign Sovereign from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R.3d 322 (2007).
33. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 99 (2d ed. 2005).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
37. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004).
38. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 118. The ship was forced to dock in the
port because of bad weather.
39. See id. at 117.
40. Id. at 120.
41. See id. at 144.
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addition, the Court pointed out that States are each equally sov-
ereign and equally independent, and it is to the benefit of all
States to have cordial relationships with each other.4 2 While the
holding of the case seemed narrowly focused on the law as ap-
plied to warships, American courts soon extended the immunity
doctrine to other types of State-owned property.4
Gradually, the idea that States should be immune from lia-
bility for any and all of their actions lost favor with some of the
international community.4 4 A sea change occurred after World
War I and was in part the result of Soviet nationalization of in-
dustry.45 This brought about a tremendous increase in States
acting in private capacities. In addition, globalization increased
States' interaction with each other.46 Thus, in the 1940s and
1950s, State practice moved away from absolute immunity.4 As
foreign governments embraced an exception for commercial ac-
tivity, the U.S. State Department studied how other sovereigns
were handling sovereign immunity and concluded that the
United States should adopt a restricted form of immunity.48
This position was officially embraced by the United States gov-
42. See id. at 136.
43. SeeJEFFPREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NoRims, ACTORS, PROCESS: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 418-19 (2d ed., 2006) (citing Republic of Mexico v. Hoff-
man, 324 U.S. 30 (1944)). England's jurisprudence followed the same path. See id. at
420.
44. See CASSESE, supra note 33, at 100 (stating that Belgian and Italian case law
pioneered the idea that State sovereignty should be limited in cases where a State acts
in a private capacity).
45. See id.
46. See Joseph M. Terry, Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1029, 1029 (1999) (commenting on the "dramatic growth of
international trade and the rise in both the complexity and intensity of relations be-
tween nation-states").
47. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 419.
48. See id. Note that the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States and Their Property opened for signature on January 17, 2005, and as of May
2007, is awaiting the thirty instruments of ratification needed for entry into force.
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
G.A. Res 59/38, 1 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 16, 2004); see Press Release, Ad
Hoc Committee on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, The United
Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property will be
Open for Signature from 17 January 2005 to 17 January 2007 (Mar. 17, 2005), available
at http://www.un.org/law/jurisdictionalimmunities/. The treaty is the first multina-
tional treaty to address the restricted theory of sovereign immunity. The rule of sover-
eign immunity under the treaty closely resembles U.S. law, providing that a State is
generally immune from the jurisdiction of another State unless a listed exception ap-
plies, including the commercial activities exception.
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ernment in May 1952, in what is known as the Tate Letter, a
letter to the Department of Justice from the State Department.4 9
The letter explained that the "widespread and increasing prac-
tice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activ-
ities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing
business with them to have their rights determined in the
courts. ' 5' The letter specified that the new position of the State
Department would be to follow the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity.5
1
The Tate Letter had serious flaws, first among them the fail-
ure of the letter to specify the difference between public and
private acts, a distinction central to the restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity.52 In addition, the decision of what was public
and what was private was left to the executive branch, which
often bowed to pressure from foreign governments. 5 The same
situation would often yield different results, necessitating precise
rules. 54 Various groups called for reform, and in 1976 Congress
responded by passing the FSIA.55
B. The Purposes Behind the FSIA
The purposes of the FSIA are set out at 28 U.S.C. § 1602:
The Congress finds that. . . [u]nder international law, states
are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts inso-
far as their commercial activities are concerned, and their
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction
ofjudgments rendered against them in connection with their
commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States.56
49. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 419-20.
50. Schopler, supra note 32, § 5(b).
51. See id.
52. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 420.
53. See id. at 421; see also Allison Marston Danner & Adam Marcus Samaha, Judicial
Oversight in Two Dimensions: Charting Area and Intensity in the Decisions ofJustice Stevens, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2051, 2060 (2006) ("From 1952 to 1976, the Executive decided on a
case-by-case basis whether to 'suggest' that immunity be granted, and its suggestions
would determine whether the suit would be dismissed by the court on that basis.").
54. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 421.
55. See id. Legal writers and judges have attacked the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity for years. See, e.g., id.; see also Schopler, supra note 32.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The FSIA was designed to achieve four goals.57 First, and
most importantly, Congress set out to codify the restrictive the-
ory of sovereign immunity.5" Second, Congress aimed to estab-
lish a regime where sovereign immunity was applied consistently
and uniformly in U.S. courts.5 9 In addition (and very important
for the purposes of this Article), the FSIA sought to establish "a
formal procedure for making service of process upon, giving no-
tice to, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
State or one of its instrumentalities in an action in a United
States court."6 ° Finally, it was an attempt to loosen the execution
immunity rules against foreign States to match jurisdiction im-
munity rules.61
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The FSIA provides that foreign States shall be immune from
suit in U.S. courts:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as pro-
vided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.6 2
As stated in section 1604 above, there are exceptions to sov-
ereign immunity, which can be found within the Act, and are of
crucial importance, since federal court subject matter jurisdic-
tion is obtained only where a listed exception applies. 6 Where
subject matter jurisdiction attached under the exceptions to the
FSIA, personal jurisdiction will automatically follow as long as
the defendant has been properly served.6 4 Section 1602 codifies
the commercial activities exception discussed in the Tate Let-
ter.65 Commercial activity is defined by section 1603:
57. 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 3662
(3d ed. 1998) (citing H.R. REPi. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6604-35).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 169. The purpose of this rule is "to remedy, at least in part, the
predicament of a plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against a foreign state." Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
63. See id. § 1605; see also id. § 1330(a).
64. See id. § 1330(a).
65. See id. § 1602.
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A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act. The commercial character of an activity shall be deter-
mined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose.
66
A "commercial activity carried on in the United States by a
foreign state" means commercial activity carried on by such
state and having substantial contact with the United States.67
There are a number of other exceptions to the FSIA in addi-
tion to the commercial activities exception. One of these, the
expropriation exception, is of crucial importance to art and an-
tiquities cases:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case-in
which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged
for such property is present in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity carried on in the United States
by the foreign state; or that property or any property ex-
changed for such property is owned or operated by an agency
or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or in-
strumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the
United States.68
D. The Trend-Broadening the Application of the
Sovereign Immunities Act
The United States has gradually, through the forward mo-
tion of case law, expanded the application of FSIA exceptions.
This expansion has cut back the immunity that foreign nations
can expect and opened the door to obtain subject matter juris-
diction over States and their instrumentalities. Two cases that
illustrate this progression are Millen Indus. v. Coordination Council
for N. Am. Affairs,6 9 and Argentina v. Weltover, Inc..v°
Millen is a case where the court narrowly read the sovereign
immunities exception. The court had to consider how to handle
66. Id. § 1603(d).
67. Id. § 1603(e).
68. Id. § 1605(a)(3).
69. 855 F.2d 879 (D.D.C. 1988).
70. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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a situation of mixed sovereign/commercial character. In doing
so, the court decided that when a transaction consists of both
commercial and sovereign elements, jurisdiction under the FSIA
should be determined by looking to the element the cause of
action is based on.7' A transaction may be partly commercial;
however, jurisdiction will not result if the cause of action is based
on a sovereign activity.7 2
A more expansive reading of the FSIA exception was taken
by Argentina v. Weltover. The Weltover case was one in which bond
holders brought a breach of contract case against Argentina for
not paying the bond holders when payment was due.7 3 The
bonds had been issued by the government of Argentina as part
of a program to stabilize the country's national debt."4 Argen-
tina claimed it was immune from suit under the FSIA. The
Court disagreed, finding that the issuing of bonds was a com-
mercial act.7 5 In making this determination, the Court looked to
the "nature" of the act rather than its "purpose."76 In the instant
case, the commercial character of the bonds was "confirmed by
the fact that they are in almost all respects garden-variety debt
instruments. 77
This expansion of the FSIA did not end with Weltover. The
four art cases described in the next section are themselves a con-
tinuation of the trend toward expanding the jurisdiction-confer-
ring provisions of the FSIA.
III. THE ART AMD ANTIQUITIES CASES
A. Republic of Austria v. Altmann 7
The most important of all of the FSIA art cases is Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, which was decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2004. The plaintiff in this case was the niece of the late
Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, an Austrian sugar baron and patron of
the arts during the early twentieth century.79 Bloch-Bauer was a
71. See Millen, 855 F.2d at 885.
72. See id.
73. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 609.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 614.
77. Id.
78. 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
79. See id. at 680.
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Jew who was forced to flee Germany shortly before World War II,
leaving behind his palatial home, including several paintings by
Gustav Klimt. s° Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer had acquired the Klimt
paintings from his wife, Adele, who predeceased him in 1925.81
Adele Bloch-Bauer, who was the subject of two of the paintings
(and was rumored to have been romantically involved with
Klimt)8 2 bequeathed, among other items, the six Klimt paintings
to Ferdinand, "in which she 'asked' her husband 'after his death'
to bequeath the paintings to the [Austrian] Gallery."8 " Ferdi-
nand never transferred ownership to the Gallery, nor did he ever
regain possession of his paintings. He remained exiled and pen-
niless in Switzerland until his death in 1945.84 Shortly before he
died, Ferdinand bequeathed his entire estate to his nephew and
nieces. s5 The plaintiff, Maria Altmann, is the sole surviving
member of this group.
Austria claimed that the Bloch-Bauer heirs had no legiti-
mate claim to the paintings because Adele's will directed Ferdi-
nand to leave the paintings to the Austrian Gallery. 6 Altmann
contradicted this claim, pointing out that Adele's request was
non-binding.8 7 Altmann also speculated that her Aunt Adele,
who made the request for the paintings to go to the Austrian
Gallery because of her great love for Austria, would have ab-
horred Austria's involvement in World War II, thus would not
have wanted her paintings to belong to Austria.88
Altmann originally brought claims for restitution before an
advisory board established by Austria to resolve restitution
claims s.8  The advisory board ordered some minor items re-
turned but decided that five of the Klimt paintings should re-
80. See id.
81. See id. at 681.
82. See Martha B.G. Lufkin, A Sea-Snake at the Austrian National Gallery: Republic of
Austria et al. v. Altman, Decision of Austrian Arbitral Court, 15th January 2006, 11 ART,
ANTIQUIv & LAw 351, 368-69 (2006) (citing C. Vogel, Klimt Painting Sells for a Record
$135 Million, N.Y. TIMEs, June 19, 2006); see also Anne-Marie O'Connor, A Portrait of
Perseverance: U.S. Supreme Court Writes the Next Chapter in the Story of a Painting, Nazi Looters
and an Elderly Heir, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at 1.
83. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 681-82.
84. See id. at 704-05.
85. See id. at 682.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See generally O'Connor, supra note 82.
89. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 705.
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main at the Austrian Gallery."° Maria Altmann then filed this
lawsuit in U.S. federal court in Los Angeles. 1
The central issue in the Altmann case was whether the FSIA
provided federal court jurisdiction under the expropriation ex-
ception. The defendants contended that jurisdiction under the
FSIA did not apply because at the time the alleged taking oc-
curred, the FSIA had not yet been enacted. 2 Therefore, the de-
fendants argued, Austria should be entitled to absolute immu-
nity from suit in U.S. courts.9" They further complained that
nothing in the FSIA made that statute apply retroactively.94 The
defendants relied on the fact that most courts before Altmann
interpreted the FSIA to have no retroactive applicability to con-
duct prior to 1952.95
The Supreme Court disregarded the defendant's argument
and found that the FSIA should be applied to Austria's 1948 ac-
tions." The Court went further in articulating that Congress in-
tended the Act to apply to conduct that occurred before the en-
actment of the FSIA.9 7 It based this viewpoint in part on the
preamble of the Act.98
The Supreme Court pointed out that the language empha-
sized "claims," not "actions."99 The Court stated that "this lan-
guage suggests Congress intended courts to resolve all such
claims 'in conformity with the principles set forth' in the Act,
regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred."'100 It then
looked to the structure of the statute to support its conclu-
sion.10 1 Finally, the Court held that applying the FSIA retroac-
90. See id. at 705-06. Sixteen Klimt drawings and nineteen porcelain settings, part
of Ferdinand's prize collection, were returned. See Lufkin, supra note 82.
91. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 706.
92. See id. at 681. The United States adopted the restrictive view of sovereign im-
munity in 1952 and enacted the FSIA in 1976. See Lufkin, supra note 82, at 361.
93. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 681.
94. See id. at 686.
95. See Choi, supra note 14, at 173 (citing WRIGHT, supra note 57, § 3662).
96. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 697.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 697-98 (emphasis in original) (explaining that "this language is unam-
biguous: Immunity 'claims' - not actions protected by immunity, but assertions of im-
munity to suits arising form those actions - are relevant."). Id. at 697.
101. See id. at 697. For example, the preamble to the FSIA makes plain Congress's
awareness that the Act would apply to pre-enactment behavior, quoting the Act as stat-
ing "[cilaims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the
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tively is consistent with two of the purposes of the Act, which are
"clarifying the rules that judges should apply in resolving sover-
eign immunity claims and eliminating political participation in
the resolution of such claims."' 2
Thus, by a vote of six to three, the United States Supreme
Court held that the FSIA can be retroactively applied even to
conduct that occurred prior to the United States' adoption of
the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.10 3
B. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam'0 4
The plaintiffs in Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam are the heirs of
Kazimir Malewicz, who was a famous abstract artist in the early
twentieth century.'0 5 The plaintiffs claimed that the City of Am-
sterdam (a subdivision of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) had
expropriated eighty-four paintings by Malewicz.' °6 The City of
Amsterdam responded by claiming that they were not subject to
the court's jurisdiction under the FSIA.' °7 The events compris-
ing the taking occurred over a number of years. A much-simpli-
fied synopsis of the complicated chain of events is as follows:
Some years after Malewicz's death, the Stedelijk museum direc-
tor obtained ownership of the paintings under suspect circum-
stances from one of Malewicz's friends who had been storing the
paintings at the artist's request.0 8 The paintings had been
housed at the Stedelijk museum since 1958.109 In 1996, several
of the Malewicz heirs requested return of the paintings."0 Am-
sterdam refused to return the paintings."' According to the
opinion, it had taken the heirs years to find each other, a task
United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chap-
ter." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006)) (emphasis added).
102. See id. at 699.
103. See id. at 697. The Supreme Court's decision returned the case to the district
court in California. At that point, Maria Altmann and Austria agreed to binding arbitra-
tion, without appeal in Austria. The arbitration court ruled on January 15, 2006 that
the paintings had to be returned to the Bloch-Bauer heirs. The paintings were subse-
quently sold. See Lufkin, supra note 82, at 368-69.
104. 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
105. See id. at 300-01.
106. See id. at 300.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 301-04.
109. See id. at 302-03.
110. See id. at 303.
111. See id.
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that had been impossible until the fall of communism. 112
In 2003, fourteen of the eighty-four paintings came to the
United States as part of a temporary art exhibition. 1 3 While the
paintings were in the United States, the heirs filed a lawsuit in
U.S. district court.114 Before the City of Amsterdam was served,
the paintings returned to the Netherlands." 5 The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss based on the FSIA, claiming the court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction.' 16 The plaintiffs con-
tended that subject matter jurisdiction had attached through the
expropriation exception to the FSIA found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (3)."7 This section would allow the plaintiffs to bring
suit against the foreign sovereign if the following three elements
were met: (1) rights in property were taken in violation of inter-
national law; (2) the property is present in the United States;
and, (3) the property has a connection to a commercial activity
in the United States conducted by a foreign state.'
A central question in the Malewicz case was whether the
commercial activity provision of the FSIA overrode the common
law in rem requirement." 9 The court concluded that the fact
that the lawsuit was filed while the paintings were in the United
States was "sufficient to meet the 'present in the United States'
factor of FSIA without regard to later service of the com-
plaint."'120  The court overruled defendants' motion to dis-
MiS121miss. 12
C. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain 1 2
2
The plaintiff in the case, Claude Cassirer, is the grandson of
Lily Cassirer Neubauer, who was forced to give her Camille Pis-
saro painting to a Nazi art dealer in 1939 in exchange for an exit
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 303.
116. Id. at 305.
117. Id. at 306.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (3).
119. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 309. The common law had required that "a
plaintiff obtain in rem jurisdiction over property before suit could be filed against a
foreign sovereign." Id.
120. Id. at 310.
121. Id. at 298.
122. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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visa out of Germany. 12' The painting ultimately ended up as
part of the collection of Baron Thyssen-Bornemisza, and was dis-
played with the rest of the collection in a state-owned palace in
Spain. 124 In 1993, legal ownership of the painting was trans-
ferred to the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation.1 25
In 2000, Mr. Cassirer learned that the foundation owned
the painting. 126 He went through several non-judicial channels
in an attempt to gain possession of the painting. 27 None of
these methods was successful. Finally, he filed a suit against
Spain in a U.S. district court without having ever brought the
case to a Spanish judicial body.'1 8 The defendants moved to dis-
miss the case for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, as well as for lack of jurisdiction.1 29
The primary issue for the court to consider in this case was
whether there had been a taking in violation of international
law."3° In addressing this issue, the court first considered
whether there existed a case or controversy as required by Arti-
cle III of the U.S. Constitution. In settling this question, the
court examined whether they had the authority to return the
painting to an heir of the original owner when the Kingdom of
Spain was not involved in the original taking.' The court
found no difficulty in answering this question in the affirmative,
since this issue had been well-settled by previous cases.'1 2 Since
there was a legitimate dispute as to who was the rightful owner of
the painting, a case or controversy was found to exist.13 3
The court next considered whether the foundation was an
agent or instrumentality of the State.'13 They looked to the defi-
123. Id. at 1161.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Mr. Cassirer made a request of Spain's Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports for the return of the painting. Upon the denial of his request, five U.S. Con-
gressmen intervened on his behalf. This, too, proved unsuccessful. See Kevin Chamber-
lain, The US Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act and Its Application to Nazi-Expropriated Works of
Art: Claude Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 11 ART, ANTIQUITY & LAw 371, 372 (2006).
128. Cassirer, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1162.
131. Id. at 1163.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1163.
134. Id. at 1163-64.
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nition provided by the FSIA, which defines an "agent or instru-
mentality" as follows:
An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or other-
wise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political sub-
division thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a State
of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of
this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
11 5
Since Mr. Cassirer never filed suit in Spain, the court pro-
ceeded to examine whether the FSIA contains an exhaustion of
local remedies requirement. 136 The defendant raised the issue
because the Altmann concurring opinion speculated that an ex-
haustion of local remedies requirement might be a part of the
FSIA. 13 7 The Cassirer court dismissed this idea, stating that the
Altmann majority found no such requirement. Most impor-
tantly, the court relied on the fact that the statute itself included
no such limitation.13 ' The court found that this manifested the
will of Congress not to include such a requirement.
1 39
The court next examined whether there had been a taking
by a sovereign. The defendants claimed that while a taking had
occurred, it had not been by a sovereign because the taker was a
Munich art dealer.1 40 However, the court found that the dealer,
as a member of the Nazi party, was acting as an agent of the
State. 4 1 The defense also claimed that the taking could not be
in violation of international law because Mrs. Cassirer was a Ger-
man national and the painting was expropriated by Germany.1
4 2
The court disagreed, citing the fact that Mrs. Cassirer, as a Jew,
was stripped of her citizenship by the Nazi party.1 43 Therefore
the taking was in violation of international law.' 4 4
Next, the court considered whether it had personal and sub-
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006).
136. Cassirer, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
137. Id. (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 714 (2004)).
138. Id. at 1164.
139. Id.
1140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 1165.
143. Id. at 1165-66.
144. See id. at 1166.
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ject matter jurisdiction over this case, and concluded that under
the FSIA, "subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process
equals personal jurisdiction.' 14 5 Finally, the court considered
whether the Kingdom of Spain (or its agent or instrumentality)
had engaged in a commercial activity in the United States. The
court first looked to the statutory definition of commercial activ-
ity under the FSIA.146 The court pointed out that "[t]he statu-
tory language imposes no requirement that the commercial ac-
tivity relate in any way to the illegally expropriated property.
Nor does it even suggest that the exception applies only where
the foreign sovereign is engaged in continuous and systematic
commercial activity within the United States."1 4 7
The court found that evidence of the Foundation's
purchases and sales in the United States was adequate to satisfy
the commercial activity requirement.1"' Based on the above con-
siderations, the court concluded that an FSIA exception applied
and the case should not be dismissed.' 49
D. Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation 15 °
Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation involved a relig-
ious corporation that filed an action in U.S. district court claim-
ing that the Russian Federation and its instrumentalities took sa-
cred texts and documents in violation of international law. The
plaintiff, the Chabad, is an organization of Jewish communities
from around the world, 151 that originated in Russia.' 5 2 Over the
145. Id. at 1167-68 (citing Abur v. Republic of Sudan, 437 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172
(D.D.C. 2006) ("under the FSIA, subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process
equals personal jurisdiction" and the "Due Process Clause imposes no limitation on a
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign state")).
146. Id. at 1170.
147. Id. at 1171.
148. Id. at 1172-73. Examples include media licensing agreements with museums
for posters, postcards and other related materials sold. The Foundation also purchased
items from the United States, including books from American bookstores. Ironically,
one of the books purchased by the museum from Amazon.com was The Lost Museum:
The Nazi Conspiracy to Steal the World's Greatest Works of Art (see supra note 3 for full
citation). Id.
149. Id. at 1178-79. Note that this opinion was limited to whether the case could
go forward. The question of who the painting belongs to has not yet been resolved. See
Chamberlain, supra note 127, at 378.
150. 466 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2006).
151. Id. at 10-11.
152. See id. at 11. According to the opinion,
Chasidism, the movement of Chasidim (literally, the "righteous"), was
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years, the Rabbis collected religious texts, manuscripts, handwrit-
ten teachings, correspondence and other documents."' 3 These
were passed from Rabbi to Rabbi and have acquired great sym-
bolic importance to the group. 154 The group lost possession of
part of the collection after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.155
They were forced to part with more of the collection later when
a Rabbi living in Poland was forced to flee Poland ahead of the
Nazi invasion.156 This part of the collection was taken in turn by
the Soviet army after the war as a trophy and moved to the Rus-
sian State Military Archive. 157
The Chabad claimed that both parts of their collection had
been taken in violation of international law. Since a taking in
violation of international law is an exception to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity under the FSIA, the U.S. federal courts
would have jurisdiction to hear the case. The defendants moved
to dismiss the case for lack ofjurisdiction under the FSIA, the act
of state doctrine, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 58
The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over a portion of
the Chabad's claims.15 9
In reaching this result, the court examined the jurisdiction-
granting provisions of the FSIA. The plaintiff raised the expro-
priation exception located in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (3), requiring
that: (1) rights in the property are at issue; (2) the property was
taken in violation of international law; and, (3) the property at
issue is owned or operated by the state or its agent or instrumen-
tality and that agent or instrumentality engages in commercial
founded in the mid-18th Century in Eastern Europe by Rabbi Israel ben
Eliezer, known as the Baal Shem Toy ("Master of the Good Name"). The
teachings of the Baal Shem Tov emphasized the presence of God in all things,
including the most mundane. The movement was in its origin intensely com-
munity oriented and centered on leaders, generally disciples of the Baal Shem
Tov, who served as mediators between the Chasid, God and the society outside
the community. The movement divided itself into several groups centered on individ-
ual leaders and local communities, one of which was Chabad Chasidism, which be-
came known as Lubavitch Chasidism after the town in Russia in which the
movement was centered in its early years.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 11-12.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 12-13.
157. See id. at 13.
158. See id. at 10.
159. Id.
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activity in the United States.' 60
The decision in this case turned on element two-whether
the property was taken in violation of international law. The
court used elements from Siderman v. Republic of Argentina to
guide its analysis of whether such a taking had occurred.1 6 ' The
Siderman court stated that a taking violates international law if it
fulfills the following circumstances: (1) it was not for a public
purpose; (2) it was discriminatory; or, (3) no just compensation
was provided for the property taken. 1
62
The Plaintiff disputed the idea that the takings were illegal
under international law, however, the court found that the col-
lection "came into the defendants' possession at different times
and by different means," therefore had to be analyzed separately
under the takings exception. 163
In both sets of circumstances it was clear that the takings
were not for a public purpose, were discriminatory, and were not
followed by just compensation. 164 At issue was the citizenship of
the Rabbis in relation to the taking States. That is because of the
principle that "international law does not govern disputes be-
tween a sovereign nation and its citizens." '165 The court found
that the taking around the time of the Russian revolution was
not a taking in violation of international law because the Rabbi
was a citizen of the taking state.166 The court explained that
" [w] hile takings of property without compensation violate Amer-
ican public policy regardless of the nationality of the property
owner, they violate international law only where the property
160. Id. at 15 (citing Peterson v. Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 416 F.3d 83, 86-
87 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
161. See id. at 15-16.
162. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir.
1992) (discussing West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987)).
163. Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 17. Note that the Chabad contested that the taking occurred near the
time of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Instead, they claimed that the taking oc-
curred in 1992 when the Chabad claimed title to the materials. The court refused to be
persuaded by this argument, quoting a State Department letter: "Under international
law, the date for taking is fixed by the date of the expropriation decrees and/or the
date of physical seizure, and not by a subsequent date of repudiation of an undertaking
to provide compensation." Id. at 16-18 (quoting Dayton v. Czechoslovak Socialist Re-
public, 834 F.2d 203, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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owner is an alien.' 67
The result was different for the part of the collection taken
during and after World War 1I. The defendant argued that it
had taken the sacred materials from the Nazis, not from the re-
ligious group.168  However, the court applied the rule that the
defendant State need not be the taking State.'6 9 The court had
little difficulty finding that the Nazi expropriation violated inter-
national law. 170 The court held that the Soviet Army's taking of
the sacred documents from the Nazis was also a taking in viola-
tion of international law.171 Therefore, the first taking could not
be considered further by U.S. courts, but the second taking pro-
ceeded to the next level of consideration, namely, whether a
commercial activity nexus could be established between the de-
fendant state (or its agent or instrumentality) and the United
States. 17
2
The Chabad relied on the clause of the statute that pro-
vided that a commercial activity has occurred if "the entity that
owns or operates the property at issue [is] engaged in a commer-
cial activity in the United States."'1 73 The court determined that
Congress gave courts broad discretion in deciding whether a
commercial activity had occurred. 174 In the case of the collec-
tion housed in the Russian State Military Archive ("RSMA"), the
court took notice of the fact that the RSMA entered into con-
tracts with two American companies for duplicating and selling
museum materials.' 75 After dismissing the defendants' claim
that allowing the suit to continue in U.S. courts would violate the
167. Id. at 17 (quoting De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385,
1397 n.17 (5th Cir. 1985)).
168. Id. at 20.
169. Id. (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (3) uses the "passive voice to focus on
the act of the taking rather than on the actor"); see also Altmann v. Republic of Austria,
142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2001), afJ'd, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
170. Id. at 19-20.
171. Id. at 20.
172. Id. at 23 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (3) (2006)).
173. Id. at 24 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006)).
174. Id. at 24. The statute specifies that courts should look to the nature of the
conduct rather than its purpose, and should not rely on a State's profit motive. 28
U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2006). See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,
614 (1992).
175. See id. at 24-25. These transactions included a contract to reproduce a collec-
tion of documents, one of which concerned the Spanish Civil War, and another was a
compilation of the papers of Leon Trotsky. Id. at 25.
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act of state doctrine and the principle of forum non conveniens,
the court held that the U.S. federal court had jurisdiction of the
Chabad's claims to part, but not all, of the collection. 1
76
IV. IS THIS EXPANSIVE RFADING OF THE
FSIA APPROPRIATE?
A. Congressional Authority
In Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, a unanimous U.S. Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FSJA's jurisdic-
tional grant.17 7 The Court stated that "[b]y reason of its author-
ity over foreign commerce and foreign relations, Congress has
the undisputed power to decide, as a matter of federal law,
whether and under what circumstances foreign nations should
be amenable to suit in the United States. "al 78 The appellate court
had argued that the situation in Verlinden was unconstitutional
because the action did not arise under federal law nor did it trig-
ger diversity jurisdiction.'79 The Supreme Court opposed this
interpretation of the law, explaining that the FSLA is composed
of "two complementary parts, one that defined, as a matter of
federal law, the circumstances in which sovereign immunity was
waived, and the second asserting federal court jurisdiction over
such claims."1 80 It is important to note that the opinion was
based on two independent bases of authority-foreign com-
merce and foreign relations.18' This is essential because there
can be situations where Congress envisioned the FSIA to apply
where one but not both sources of authority might be impli-
cated. In the Verlinden case, for example, Congressional author-
ity to regulate foreign commerce alone would not have been
enough on which to base the holding since the FSIA applies to
both contracts and torts.1 82
The Offenses Clause of the Constitution provides additional
authority for Congress to create ajurisdiction-granting provision
176. Id. at 30. For a discussion of the act of state doctrine and the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, see infra Section V.
177. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
178. Id. at 493.
179. See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and
Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 447, 529 (2000).
180. Id. at 529 (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486-97).
181. See id. at 530.
182. See id.
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within the FSIA.18 3 This "long-ignored Clause" grants Congress
the power to "define and punish ... [o]ffenses against the Law
of Nations." '184 This is the only mention of international law in
the Constitution,185 and may provide authorization for "virtually
any legislation that specifies rules governing interactions with
foreign actors. "186 The Supreme Court has briefly noted in two
cases that the Offenses Clause provides justification for the
FSIA's jurisdiction-granting provision." 7
B. Other "Shield" Statutes Used as "Swords"
The federal long arm provision of the FSIA has been used as
a "sword" to obtain jurisdiction over defendants in a wide variety
of cases other than cases involving art restitution. In addition to
the Verlinden decision discussed above, there are other important
examples. Two oft-cited cases are National American Corp. v. Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria, 1 8 and Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A.' 9 In
the National American case, the court used the commercial activi-
ties exception to get jurisdiction over the Federal Republic of
Nigeria in a breach of contract action involving an agreement to
purchase cement.19 ° In The Vermeulen case, the court held that
the FSIA conferred federal court jurisdiction on a Georgia court
where a car owner was injured by defective design and manufac-
ture of a French automaker.'91
A question related to the issue of whether it is proper for
the FSIA to be used as a jurisdiction-granting sword is raised by
Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System: "How
far may Congress go in enacting jurisdictional provisions that by
their terms authorize federal courts to adjudicate a claim (even
if not based on federal law) if, and only if, the claim is not sub-
183. See id. at 461 (stating that "[i]n enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA), Congress relied on several Article I powers, including the power to define
offenses against the law of nations").
184. Id. at 449 (citing the U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). Stephens points out that
the clause is rarely cited by the Supreme Court or discussed in legal scholarship. Id.
185. See id. at 452.
186. Id. at 530.
187. See id. at 461 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428, 436 (1989); Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n. 19
(1983)).
188. 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
189. 985 F.2d 1534 (lth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993).
190. 448 F. Supp. at 639.
191. Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1552-53.
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ject to a valid federal defense?"' 92 The Supreme Court has indi-
rectly answered this question in one post-Verlinden case. In Gu-
tierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, the Supreme Court held that this
issue presents no grave Article III problem.'93 The dissent took
a drastically different viewpoint, warning that determining
"whether a court has jurisdiction over the cause of action sup-
plies the very jurisdiction that is subject to challenge." '194
V. POTENTIAL SAFEGUARDS
A court may have jurisdiction to hear a case, yet refrain
from doing so based on some other legal principle. This Section
will describe three doctrines that might be invoked even where a
FSIA exception confers federal court jurisdiction. Any one of
these principles may be an appropriate way to limit federal
courts from hearing a case involving art and foreign govern-
ments.
A. Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine often overlaps with the FSIA.
Therefore, in cases where the act of state doctrine applies, it can
be a safeguard to prevent overly broad application of the juris-
diction-granting provisions of the FSIA. The act of state doctrine
is a principle of deference by which courts of the United States
refrain from passing judgment on official acts of foreign govern-
ments undertaken within that State's territory.195 The effect of
the doctrine is a grant of immunity for foreign State actions as
long as two conditions are met-the act is an official one and it
occurs within the foreign State's territory.
The first Supreme Court case to recognize the act of state
doctrine was Underhill v. Hernandez.1"6 This case involved a
United States citizen suing Venezuela for damages arising from
his detention by the Venezuelan military."9 7 The Supreme Court
denied his request, stating:
192. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 852 (5th ed. 2003).
193. 515 U.S. 417, 435 (1995).
194. Id. at 442.
195. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCriON TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (4th ed.
2003).
196. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
197. Id. at 251.
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Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of an-
other done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between them-
selves.' 9
8
The act of state doctrine is firmly entrenched in American
law and has a strong foundation ofjudicial decisions upon which
it rests. There are a long line of cases building upon and ex-
panding upon the rule set forth in Underhill.'9 9
This doctrine is not coextensive with the FSIA. First of all,
the act of state doctrine and the FSIA rest on different bases:
20 0
Instead of looking to the limits of the jurisdiction of national
courts as does the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, the
act of state doctrine is fundamentally concerned with the pre-
scriptive jurisdiction of the foreign state. Thus, instead of op-
erating as a jurisdictional principle, the act of state doctrine
functions rather like a choice-of-law rule. The result is a
court's acceptance of the legitimacy of the foreign state's ter-
ritorial prescriptions, untested either by international or do-
mestic standards.20 '
As stated above, the act of state doctrine will not apply in all
instances where the FSIA applies. The act of state doctrine only
applies to official State actions. Post-Sabbatino act of state doc-
trine cases have made this clear and prevented the doctrine
from expanding in such a way that the practical effect would be
to function as a doctrine of absolute immunity.
20 2
198. Id. at 252.
199. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964);
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918).
200. SeeJANrS, supra note 195, at 354.
201. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 17 (1965)).
202. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400
(1990) (holding no sovereign act at issue where Nigerian officials were bribed in an
effort to win a contract); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976) (holding that repudiation of a national debt cannot be treated as an act of
state because of its commercial nature); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (holding that where the act of state doctrine would not
further U.S. foreign policy, the doctrine should not be applied); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that the act of state doctrine
does not apply where there is not an official act).
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B. Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is a prudential justiciability
doctrine. It is a directive to courts to avoid a certain class of
cases even though they may fulfill all other justiciability require-
ments. 2 3 The rationale behind the rule is to leave certain sensi-
tive situations to the "politically accountable branches of govern-
ment.' ' 20 4 The political question doctrine is triggered by several
categories of controversies including questions of foreign policy.
In the area of foreign policy, the Supreme Court has held time
and again that cases presenting foreign affairs should not be
heard by the courts in accordance with the political question
doctrine.2 °5
The leading case on the political question doctrine is Baker
v. Carr.206 Baker was a challenge to Tennessee's apportionment
scheme.20 7 In deciding whether this question could properly be
considered, the Supreme Court stated that "[n] ot only does res-
olution of [foreign relations and other] issues frequently turn on
standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of
a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legisla-
tive, but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced
statement of the Government's views. '208 The Supreme Court
then clarified the state of the law by establishing a six part test
for finding a case would not be appropriately resolved through
adjudication:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolv-
ing it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
203. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIClnON 143 (4th ed. 2003).
204. Id.
205. See id. at 155.
206. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
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question.2 °9
Another important case considering the political question
doctrine is Whiteman v. Dorotheum GMBH & Co. 210 Whiteman was
a World War II restitution case that centered on the applicability
of the political question doctrine. 211 The plaintiffs claimed that
Altmann had left open the question of how much deference the
courts should show the executive branch in "asserting jurisdic-
tion over a foreign sovereign."212 In deciding the Whiteman case,
the court noted that the executive branch has a policy of resolv-
ing restitution claims through international agreements. 213 In
2001, the United States entered into an executive agreement es-
tablishing a fund to compensate persons whose property was
confiscated during World War 11.214 The court noted the "capac-
ity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in
dealing with other governments' to resolve claims ... arising out
of World War II," and held that the plaintiffs' claims were non-
justiciable under the political question doctrine.215
Although there are places of overlap between the political
question doctrine and the FSLA, they have distinct features. The
most important distinction is that since the political question
doctrine is prudential, courts may have discretion in applying it
since they are not constitutionally bound not to hear the case. It
does not apply in every case involving foreign relations. The
Baker v. Carr Court admonished that "it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies be-
yond judicial cognizance." 216 This raises the difficult question of
how to determine which foreign policy questions are non-justici-
able under the political question doctrine. The Supreme Court
has developed guidelines as it considers each issue on a case-by-
case basis. For example, it is well settled that the following are
non-justiciable political questions: (1) definition of the begin-
ning or ending of war;217 (2) recognition of foreign govern-
209. Id. at 217.
210. 431 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2005).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 59 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004)).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 60 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)).
216. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
217. See Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1953).
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ments; 218 and (3) ratification and interpretation of treaties. 219
In other areas of foreign policy not yet settled by the Su-
preme Court, the doctrine can be controversial, with conflicting
precedents. 220 Therefore, it is hard to have a definitive idea on
whether the doctrine will be applied in future art restitution
cases.
C. Forum Non-Conveniens
Another deferential doctrine with its roots in comity is fo-
rum non conveniens. Like all deferential doctrines of comity,
the rationale for the rule is to avoid offending foreign States.221
It is a recent development that has rapidly evolved into "the most
important means employed in U.S. courts for exercising comity
in cases of conflicting jurisdictional regimes. ' 222
The leading forum non conveniens case is Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, a case involving Scottish citizens who had been killed in
a Scottish airplane. 223 The estates of the victims sued the Ameri-
can aircraft manufacturer in California. The court declined to
hear the case on the basis of forum non conveniens, after deter-
mining that the crucial question in determining whether forum
non conveniens should be applied is one of convenience, not
whether the law would be more favorable in one forum than an-
other.2 2 4 In the Piper Aircraft case, the court based its decision
on the fact that most of the evidence and witnesses were in Scot-
land.22 5
Forum non conveniens is different from the FSIA in that it
only applies in cases where jurisdictional requirements have
been met.2 2 6 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a
judge can refuse to hear a case properly within its jurisdiction
218. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
219. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270
(1902). But see Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-
Gestione, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the political question doctrine did not
apply).
220. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 203, at 161-64.
221. SeeJANis, supra note 195, at 332.
222. Id. at 333.
223. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
224. See id. at 255-58.
225. See id.
226. SeeJANIS, supra note 195, at 332.
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where another court (including a foreign court) would be a
more convenient or fair forum to hear the case.227 Another dif-
ference is that the doctrine of forum non conveniens presup-
poses that there is another forum available to hear the claim.228
Therefore, the central question is not whether the plaintiff has a
claim, but rather where it will be heard. 2
CONCLUSION
The practice of bringing art and antiquities cases in U.S.
courts under the FSIA is a trend worth watching. Bringing art
and antiquities cases in United States federal courts using juris-
diction gained through an exception to the FSIA is a phenome-
non that is certain to continue. All of the factors discussed in
Section I show that while this is an old subject, events have lined
up in a way that make the present a practical time to bring these
cases, and it would be a mistake to think that the World War II
cases will be the end of this issue. The sad fact is that nations
continue to fight with one another and an unfortunate conse-
quence of war is the looting of artwork and antiquities. With the
line of cases that have emerged, as discussed above, it seems
highly likely that federal courts will hear cases involving artwork
or other items of cultural value looted during the Iraq war. U.S.
courts with lower fees and well-established systcms are often
much more hospitable for a plaintiffs lawsuit. This fact, com-
bined with the line of cases giving an expansive interpretation of
the jurisdiction-granting provisions of the FSIA, make plain the
fact that U.S. law accepts the FSIA's use as a sword. A crucial
question has been considered but still remains-is this appropri-
ate? Should the FSIA operate in such a way to make the U.S.
federal courts the forum of choice for art and antiquities cases
worldwide? This final question should be a call to scholarship to
consider how far the courts should go in interpreting the FSIA as
a sword, both in and out of the context of art and antiquities
cases.
227. See id. at 332-33 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws 84
(1969) ("A state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum for
the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate forum is available to the plain-
tiff.-)).
228. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
229. See id.
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